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Abstract. Econophysics has made a number of important additions to
scientiﬁc knowledge. Yet it continues to lack inﬂuence with both econo-
mists and policy makers. Ten years ago, I and three other economists
sympathetic to econophysics wrote a paper on worrying trends within
the discipline. For example, its lack of awareness of the economics lit-
erature, and shortfalls in the use of statistical analysis. These continue
to be obstacles to wider acceptance by economists. Like all agents,
policy makers respond to incentives, and economists understand this
very well. Much of the econophysics community appears to think that
simply doing good science is suﬃcient to have the work recognised,
rather than relating to the motivations and incentives of policy mak-
ers. Nevertheless, econophysics now has three major opportunities to
advance knowledge in areas where policy makers perceive weaknesses
in what they are presented with by economists. All can beneﬁt from
the analysis of Big Data. The ﬁrst is a core model of agent behaviour
which is more relevant to cyber society than the rational agent model
of economics. Second, extending our understanding of the business cy-
cle, primarily by incorporating the importance of networks into models.
Third, devising proper measures of output in cyber society.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
I became actively involved with the econophysics community, along with like minded
economists such as Steve Keen, Mauro Gallegati and Thomas Lux in the late 1990s.
By the mid-2000s, we continued to acknowledge both the actual and potential value
of econophysics.
But we had developed concerns, and after the World Econophysics conference
in Canberra in 2005, the four of us published a paper entitled “Worrying trends in
econophysics” [1].
So this is a timely opportunity to reﬂect upon econophysics and economics 10 years
on. The invitation from the editors to write a paper for this volume began with a
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request that the contributions should take the form of “an introspective assessment by
practitioners in the ﬁeld [of econophysics]”. The potential authors were further asked
to “stress what they think are the main issues in rebuilding the science of economics”.
Those contributors who are themselves economists were speciﬁcally enjoined to write
critiques of the “endeavour” of econophysics, and to describe how it can contribute
to the understanding of economic systems.
I am in a number of ways critical of econophysics. This is not so much in respect
of the scientiﬁc ﬁndings of the community. Rather, it is the lack of awareness of what
drives both economists and policy makers, how the community might learn to relate
to these groups better.
The substantive positive contribution of this paper is to set out three major chal-
lenges, each a very diﬃcult problem, which I believe that econophysicists, working in
conjunction with sympathetic economists, are very well placed to address.
1.2 How I came to be involved in econophysics
With these themes in mind, some background information about my own interactions
with econophysics might be helpful. I started my career as a macroeconomic forecaster
for a research institute in London, the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research. We ran a large model of the UK economy, based upon equations estimated
on time series data using econometric techniques.
It was during this time that my ﬁrst doubts about economics began to arise. A
great advantage of being a forecaster is that your model is confronted with new data
over time. You make a prediction today for the next year, say, and actual data over
this period is then published in the oﬃcial national accounts. The performance of your
equations on genuine out of sample data therefore comes under constant scrutiny. In
contrast, an econometric equation published in an academic journal, unless it becomes
one of the very few to be highly cited, is rarely, if ever, subject to the scrutiny of
genuine out of sample performance. I say it was an advantage being a forecaster, but
this is where the problems arose. The equations broke down much more frequently
and by much more substantial amounts, than econometric theory suggested. At the
time, it was a real puzzle, and I became disillusioned with economic forecasting.
My concerns about economics became more general, and in 1994 I published a
book The Death of Economics [2]. It sold well over 1 million copies worldwide. A
title which reﬂected more accurately the contents would have been something like A
Theoretical and Empirical Critique of General Equilibrium Theory and Free Market
Policies. But somehow, I doubt it would have been as successful.
I had been interested for some time in diﬀerent approaches and worked, for exam-
ple, on expert systems, as they then were, and neural networks [3,4]. But after initial
enthusiasm, none of these alternatives, at the time, seemed satisfactory.
1.3 The initial excitement of econophysics
It was in the late 1990s that I came across the work of econophysicists such as Gene
Stanley, Jean-Phillipe Bouchaud and Rosario Mantegna. This was far more exciting.
Economics is essentially a theory about how individual agents make decisions. Here
was an approach which had such a theory. It was completely diﬀerent from rational
choice in economics, where agents select in the basis of the attributes of alternatives.
In the model imported from statistical physics, agents paid no attention to such
attributes. Instead, their decisions were based on social inﬂuence, on the decisions
made by other agents.
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Within economics itself, some famous names, including Keynes, had suggested that
social inﬂuence was important in the decision making of agents, though this theme
has never been absorbed into the mainstream. Perhaps the only formal articulation of
this was the theory of what we now call preferential attachment, published by Herb
Simon as long ago as 1955 [5], and rediscovered independently in the late 1990s by
Barabasi [6].
So econophysics had a model of agent behaviour. It was one which, in terms
of the implied level of agent cognition, was at the complete opposite end of the
spectrum to that of the rational choice theory of economics. And it had some powerful
empirical ﬁndings, such as the power law distribution of ﬁrm sizes, the fat tails in
the distribution of asset price changes, and the empirical indeterminacy of the cross-
correlation matrix of such changes, revealed by the application of random matrix
theory. What more was there to like?
In fact, one of my ﬁrst publications using the approaches of econophysics helped
me to understand my long-held conundrum about why macroeconomic forecasts were
so bad. With Craig Mounﬁeld, who had just completed his PhD in statistical physics
at Cambridge, I used random matrix theory to show that key macroeconomic time
series, such as GDP, were dominated by noise rather than by signal [7].
1.4 Emergent concerns
In [1], we identiﬁed four areas of concern: “First, a lack of awareness of work that has
been done within economics itself. Second, a resistance to more rigorous and robust
statistical methodology. Third, the belief that universal empirical regularities can be
found in many areas of economic activity. Fourth, the theoretical models which are
being used to explain empirical phenomena” (p. 1).
I believe that each of these points continues to merit consideration by econophysi-
cists. Anyone interested in them can readily consult the original paper, so there is no
point in going into them in detail here. I do, however, make reference to them in the
next section.
2 Why has econophysics had little impact on either economics
or policy?
2.1 An illustrative example
By 2000, econophysicists had established scientiﬁcally beyond reasonable doubt that:
– the statistical distribution of asset price changes was fat tailed;
– the empirical correlation matrix of asset price changes, whether of asset classes
or of individual assets, was poorly determined.
These were powerful results, which from a purely scientiﬁc perspective demanded
to be taken note of. However, in the run up to the ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s, both
economists and policy makers essentially paid no attention to these ﬁndings. They
continued to rely upon Value at Risk models which assumed a Gaussian distribution
of asset price changes. And they continued to rely upon the Capital Asset Pricing
Model for assessing the risk on portfolios, which is undermined by the results on the
empirical correlation matrix obtained by random matrix theory.
It would be going too far to claim that if these ﬁndings had become widely accepted
and integrated into risk assessment processes, the ﬁnancial crisis would have been
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avoided. But, undoubtedly, both ﬁnancial institutions and policy makers in central
banks, ﬁnance ministries and international bodies would have been better equipped
to understand the level of risk in the ﬁnancial system.
Why was the science ignored? This is a wide ranging question, which could easily
be the subject of an entire book. So the discussion will inevitably be compressed and
is not intended to be completely deﬁnitive.
2.2 Policy makers and their incentives
Over the past 20 years, I have worked closely with my colleague Bridget Rosewell. She
has held a number of high proﬁle policy positions. She was Chief Economic Advisor
to the Mayor of London, for example, and was recently appointed by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer (the ﬁnance minister in the UK) to the inﬂuential Infrastructure
Commission. She is a non-executive director of several large UK companies. Together,
we have written several papers over the years on the interface between scientiﬁc
advance and policy. Our focus has been on agent based modelling and complexity
science, but our arguments apply equally well to econophysics, which in any case can
be seen as forming part of these two categories of science.
The great insight of economics is that agents react to incentives. This does not
necessarily imply that they react exactly in the way described by rational choice
theory in economics. But if the set of incentives faced by agents changes, some agents
will change their decisions. Policy makers are no diﬀerent. They, too, are inﬂuenced
by incentives, a point which non-economists often fail to appreciate.
In [8], for example, we state that “It is essential for modellers to understand
that innovation in policy analysis usually arises from the need to support a policy
preference or choice. Decision makers themselves are not in general interested in the
science which underlies the modelling”. In other words, if an existing methodology
appears to be useful to policy makers, and also appears to have underlying scientiﬁc
backing, a policy maker has little incentive to take advice from those who use a
diﬀerent methodology, even if it is scientiﬁcally superior. The advice which he or she
is receiving appears satisfactory.
When an existing approach either does not give answers acceptable to the pol-
icy maker or is not helpful, an opportunity exists for a new approach to establish
credibility. A current illustration is the work on networks and the interconnections
between ﬁnancial institutions [for example, 9]. Mainstream economic models took no
account of the network structure, a feature which was so important during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. But before the crash, policy makers believed that the existing VAR and
CAPM models gave them answers which were useful.
2.3 Why economics occupies a powerful position
The power of economics in policy making is in part due to the fact that economists
have a good understanding of the incentives which motivate policy makers. It is
worth quoting at some length from [8] “Economics has authority simply because it
has authority, and has had authority for decades. Decision makers, who in general
are not experts in any particular discipline, are often predisposed to consider the
recommendations based on economic models favourably. They are tried and trusted.
Further, economists have the advantage in that they often purport to give the an-
swer. Economics, over the course of a century or more, has honed and reﬁned its
methodological and epistemological approaches to the analysis of practical questions.
This does not mean that it correct. But because of this process within the subject,
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there is much more agreement amongst economists than is commonly supposed. So,
for example, diﬀerent teams of economists might disagree on the impact of, say, a
road pricing proposal. But they will agree on how conceptually the problem should
be approached”.
There are many criticisms of orthodox economics, and I myself have been critical
in various ways for a long time [for example, 2, 10, 11, 12]. But it is crucial to grasp
two things. First, it is not an empty box. Second, the discipline has made important
progress in some respects, particularly over the past twenty years.
2.4 Progress in economics
Economics is essentially a theory of how individual agents1 make decisions. In the
jargon of economics, it is concerned with micro-economics. The discipline of macro
economics exists separately, and is certainly inﬂuential. But in the mainstream, at
least, models of how the economy behaves at the macro, or aggregate, level are re-
quired to be based upon micro level theoretical foundations. The seminal work was
the so-called real business cycle models by Kydland and Prescott in the 1980s [13],
for which the scholars received the Nobel Prize in 2004. The more modern versions of
these models have the exotic description of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE).
It is the area of micro-economics where economics has made distinct progress.
Compared to the mid-1990s, the contents of leading journals are much more heavily
empirical. There are two reasons for this, which I discuss in [14]. Behavioural eco-
nomics has become much more widely accepted. This involves observing how agents
actually do behave in speciﬁc situations, and comparing their behaviour to the pre-
dictions of the rational choice model. For example, it is increasingly accepted that the
eﬃcient markets hypothesis (in its various forms) is violated. One reason, for example,
is systematic over-conﬁdence (e.g. the papers in the symposium on overconﬁdence in
the Fall 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives such as [15].
In addition, there has been a parallel rise of powerful technical advances in the
econometric analysis of large scale cross-section and longitudinal data bases. One
development in particular is that of correcting for self-selection in participating in
diﬀerent kinds of policy programmes. This has opened up the way to the much more
eﬀective empirical evaluation of such programmes. For example, suppose prisoners
who take up the opportunity to learn a skill, say, show lower rates of re-oﬀending
once released. Is it the skill itself which causes this, or is it the possibility that those
who volunteer for such programmes have a higher propensity to not re-oﬀend for
other reasons?
2.5 Econophysics and economists
Most econophysicists are not economists. But the ﬁrst of the worries we expressed
in the 2006 paper cited above was a lack of awareness amongst the community of
the literature in economics. It would be going too far to say that economics is about
to abandon its core model of rational choice theory, but things have moved forward.
Economists are only too willing to dismiss criticisms or alternative approaches which
do not show familiarity with developments in economics. They may sometimes go too
far in this, but as a general principle it seems to be perfectly reasonable. It is not
1 An agent in this context can mean not just a person, but a ﬁrm, a government, an
international body, depending upon the context.
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just econophysics but the other social sciences which often continue to maintain a
caricature of economics, rather than take into account how the subject has changed.
This is not a good strategy for persuading economists to take you seriously.
The second of the worries, relating to statistical techniques, also remains relevant.
Economists are well trained in statistical analysis and are quick to dismiss discussions
which they do not think meet appropriate standards. There are many papers, for
example, in econophysics which claim to demonstrate the existence of a power law.
But whilst the distribution in such cases is highly non-Gaussian, it is often obvious
purely by visual inspection that the data follow a diﬀerent distribution than a power
law. Even worse, econophysics papers sometimes attempt to ﬁt diﬀerent power laws
to diﬀerent parts of the overall distribution. Economists would instinctively try and
describe the entire distribution. I believe that this kind of work has alienated, and
continues to alienate, economists who might otherwise be sympathetic, or at least not
dismissive of, the ideas and results of econophysics.
The fourth of the “worries” was the theoretical models being used to explain
behaviour. This has become even more salient given the developments within micro
economics. But it is this “worry” which gives the opportunity to change the tone of
this article and to look forward in a positive way to how econophysics can help to
solve one of the outstanding grand challenges in economics.
3 Three major challenges (1)
3.1 The core model of rational behaviour
All theories make simplifying assumptions in order to explain reality. The key assump-
tions of the fundamental model of economics are as follows. Each agent has a set of
tastes and preferences which are ﬁxed. These tastes and preferences are independent
of the decisions of other agents. The agent, when choosing between alternatives in
any given situation, gathers all available information on the agents. The agent has
the cognitive capacity to process this information, and compare the attributes of the
alternatives to his or her preferences. Subject to constraints such as income, the agent
then makes the best possible (the optimal) decision.
These assumptions have been relaxed in two main ways over the past few decades.
Following the seminal works of George Akerlof and Joe Stiglitz [for example 16, 17],
economists now usually assume that agents have incomplete information. The amount
of information may vary across agents, the situation of so-called asymmetric infor-
mation. Agents still optimise, and all the other assumptions remain in place, but
incomplete rather than complete information obviously widens the range of situa-
tions in which the assumptions are a reasonable approximation to reality. The second
relaxation is essentially to recognise that there are costs involved in both gather-
ing and processing information. Particularly in situations in which agents face many
alternatives, an agent may only gather and process information on a small number,
until a satisfactory one is discovered, one which is reasonably close to the prefer-
ences of the agent, who forms the view that the costs of further search outweigh the
potential beneﬁts of making a choice which matches preferences even more closely.
It is easy to poke fun at this theory, but it is by no means an empty box. In mature
consumer markets, for example, where agents are familiar with the diﬀerent brands
and their diﬀerent attributes, it is a powerful tool for understanding actual decisions.
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3.2 The challenge: what is rational behaviour in cyber society?
The real challenge is to understand the behaviour of agents in cyber society. Even be-
fore the very recent literal explosion in the amount of information created on a daily
basis in cyber, the market-oriented economies of the West had already created a stu-
pendous cornucopia of choice. Eric Beinhocker in his book The Origin of Wealth [18]
considered the choices available in New York City alone “The number of economic
choices the average New Yorker has is staggering. The Wal-Mart near JFK Airport
has over 100,000 diﬀerent items in stock, there are over 200 television channels oﬀered
on cable TV, Barnes & Noble lists over 8 million titles, the local supermarket has 275
varieties of breakfast cereal, the typical department store oﬀers 150 types of lipstick,
and there are over 50,000 restaurants in New York City”. At the stock keeping unit
level (SKU), the level at which retailers place orders, he states “The number of SKUs
in the New Yorker’s economy is not precisely known, but using a variety of data
sources, I very roughly estimate that it is on the order of tens of billions”.
The great polymath Herb Simon over sixty years ago expressed serious doubts
about the ability of agents to gather and process information in the way implied by
rational choice theory. In his seminal paper on behavioural economics [19], he wrote
“[T]he task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of ratio-
nal behavior which is compatible with the access to information and computational
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of
environments in which such organisms exist”.
As mentioned above, economists have incorporated the concept of the costs of
gathering and processing information into their theory of rational choice. Agents
search amongst alternatives until they ﬁnd one which is optimal, once they take into
account these information costs. Economists describe this decision rule as “satisﬁc-
ing”. In fact it was Simon who introduced this phrase in 1955, but his meaning was
fundamentally diﬀerent. Simon argued that in many situations, the concept of op-
timisation made no practical sense. Even ex post it might very well be impossible
to identify what the optimal decision would have been. Instead of trying to opti-
mise, agents should choose a heuristic decision rule which, for a period at least, gives
satisfactory results. Economists have completely altered Simon’s original meaning of
satisﬁcing, which of course challenges the basic principle of optimisation.
The most important challenge in economics is to construct “null models” of agent
behaviour which are applicable to the increasing number of circumstances in which
the conventional model of rational choice is no longer valid. By “null”, we mean the
basic model, which can be adapted as required to particular situations. Simon believed
that agents use rules of thumb, heuristics, as decision making rules. But it is not very
helpful to try and construct a plethora of diﬀerent rules, each unique to its context.
We need some basic principles, which can then be “tweaked” as required.
Econophysics essentially imports as its “null” model the particle model from sta-
tistical physics. The behaviour of an agent is completely governed by its interaction
with other agents. Its tastes and preferences, starting to translate the model into the
language of economics, are not ﬁxed, but are altered by interactions with others. In
complete contrast to the cognitive demands of the rational agent model, this agent
has zero intelligence.
This model does have initial plausibility in considering agent behaviour in cyber
space. The vast plethora of choices means that it could be very sensible simply to be
guided by the decisions of other agents. An important articulation of this principle is
of course that of preferential attachment.
A powerful extension of this principle is a behavioural model developed within
cultural evolution theory. Most of the time agents choose by copying from the choices
made by agents who have already made their selections, but occasionally the choice
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is based on a type of random selection. The model has had considerable application
in anthropology and cultural evolution, where it is often referred to as the “neutral”
model of selection. In other words, when agents select between alternatives, they are
“neutral” with respect to their attributes. Examples include [20–24].
In models of this kind, the structure of the connections between agents – who
inﬂuence whom – is obviously very important. Yet in their basic form, they essentially
assume that agents take into account the decisions of all other agents. So two central
challenges for econophysicists are:
– to develop cultural evolution theory so that it incorporates not just networks
with ﬁxed topology, but ones in which the structure also evolves;
– to identify in speciﬁc applications, using Big Data and advance computational
techniques, the relevant network, and to calibrate these models against the
data.
4 Three major challenges (2)
4.1 Networks and macroeconomics
Economists are beginning to appreciate the potential importance of networks. For
example, one of the 2014 issues of the leading American Economic Association journal
the Journal of Economic Perspectives carried a symposium of papers on the topic [for
example, 25]. This is an area where econophysicists can attempt to make common
cause with economists.
Networks are a crucial feature of the macro economy. In contrast to micro eco-
nomics, macro has made very little progress in recent decades, and has arguably gone
backwards. The equilibrium paradigm has been imported into macro, more precisely
into the micro foundations of macro in ways which even a fair number of mainstream
economists feel is implausible. The only way in which DSGE models are able to gen-
erate business cycles is essentially by building in more and more “imperfections” to
the otherwise unimpeded functioning of markets, in ways reminiscent of the epicycle
of Ptolemaic astronomy.
There is a great opportunity for econophysicists in the area of macroeconomics.
The mainstream models are felt to be unsatisfactory, both by policy makers and even
by mainstream economists. In the late 2000s, the world economy experienced the only
truly global recession since the early 1930s, though its impact was nowhere near as
severe as the latter, the so-called Great Recession.
4.2 The business cycle
Econophysicists have in general showed little interest in modelling what economists
describe as the business cycle. This is the persistent ﬂuctuations in the growth rate of
real output (GDP) which have been observed from the very beginnings of capitalism
in the late 18th century. They are a fundamental feature of the developed market-
oriented economies, yet economics lacks a satisfactory explanation.
As an aside, the phrase “business cycle” needs perhaps a couple of sentences in an
econophysics journal. Almost invariably, when I have shown a time series plot of, say,
annual real GDP growth rates in America to a group of econophysicists and described
it as the business cycle, there has been polite laughter. The data do not show the
regularities of a cycle in physics. But the phrase is part of the jargon of economics. We
speak of the ‘business cycle, not because we believe it follows the regularities of, say, a
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sine wave, but because within any single economy, there is strong cross-correlation of
output growth across its various industries. In the upswing, most industries do well,
and most do badly during recessions. Although there can be shocks to individual
industries, the fact that they tend to move together strongly suggests that there are
general causes at work, rather then ones speciﬁc to individual sectors.
Over a decade ago, I published a simple theoretical model in Physica A [26] in
which the business cycle was driven purely by the percolation of sentiment about
the future across ﬁrms with power law distributions of their sizes. Although very
simple, the model could replicate key underlying features of the cycle [27 for a detailed
empirical description].
Much more sophisticated versions could be developed, which also incorporate mon-
etary features. The idea that the cycle is driven by business psychology, by sentiment,
is a key theme of Keynes’ General Theory. Econophysics is already having an impact
on macro by its models of cascades across networks of ﬁnancial institutions, and there
is a great opportunity to attack a really hard and crucially important area in eco-
nomics. Analysing Big Data in ways which are guided by theoretical principles, rather
than by a purely data driven approach, oﬀer an exciting way forward.
One reason I suspect that econophysics has paid little attention to macroeconomics
is that, unlike say ﬁnancial markets or data on ﬁrms, the data sets are short and noisy.
But that it all we have. Capitalism did not start until 250 years ago (at most), so it
just not possible to generate a large number of observations of time series data on
real GDP growth.
5 Three major challenges (3)
5.1 Valuing output in cyber society
This brings me to a ﬁnal challenge, which I discuss brieﬂy. The measurement of GDP
is often criticised. It leaves out, for example, the value of housework and any costs
associated with the depletion of resources. Many economists ﬁnd these criticisms
intensely irritating, because we are perfectly aware of what we are trying to measure
with GDP. Simon Kuznets, who received the Nobel Prize for his work, pioneered the
measurement of GDP in the 1930s, and it is clear from his writings at the time what
he was and was not trying to measure. The world economy had just experienced what
was obviously a catastrophic drop in real output. We now estimate, for example, that
between 1929 and 1933, real GDP in America fell by over 20 per cent (compared to
just 3 per cent in the late 2000s). The overwhelming demand from policy makers was
for a systematic way of measuring output in the market economy. This was the task
Kuznets faced, and it was the task which he carried out.
The challenge is not the measurement of the costs of resource depletion, to give an
example. Economists have been at the forefront of such eﬀorts for several decades (for
example [28]). Rather, it is the more fundamental issues raised by the measurement
of output in the cyber economy.
The lack of information on productive knowledge, for example, is a major deﬁ-
ciency of the current system of national accounts. The work of R. Hausman [29] and
L. Pietronero [30] has made important advances here, focused as it is on the capa-
bilities which are at the heart of trading relationships. Innovation can no longer be
treated as the residual output after more easily measurable inputs and outputs are
counted. Innovation has been a core element in new ﬁrm creation and this was true
even when national accounts were being invented.
The diﬃculties of valuing innovative products and services, especially in terms of
their contribution to real output, are well known [for example 31].
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A challenge is the valuation of what are essentially public goods created in cyber
society. How is value to be assigned in the rapidly growing, so-called prosumer sector
(i.e. production and development by consumers) of the economy? The activity of
much of this sector corresponds closely to the classic deﬁnition of public goods, in
that the output is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
The issue can perhaps be illustrated with a concrete example. In recent years,
the statistical package R has become the package of choice for young scientists in
a wide range of disciplines around the world (https://www.r-project.org/). A huge
range of routines can be downloaded. It is, in the everyday sense of the word, a very
valuable tool for conducting almost any conceivable kind of statistical analysis. Its
graphics features are illuminating. But R, and all the routines associated with it, can
be downloaded for free. True, R has now become so widely used that a Foundation
has been set up to support developments. The foundation, however, is a “not for
proﬁt organization working in the public interest”. It does attract a certain amount
of funding, and so its output could be measured using conventional national account-
ing techniques. The value of R, intuitively, seems to be rather considerably greater
than this.
6 Concluding remarks
In terms of concluding remarks, it should be a source of real concern to econophysi-
cists that, despite the advances which they have made in scientiﬁc knowledge, the
intertwined worlds of both economists and policy making continue to operate almost
orthogonally from the econophysics community.
Econophysicists need to be more aware of the incentives and motivations of policy
makers. Doing good science is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition to get their
attention. Equally, they need to be more willing to engage with economists, rather
than simply attempting to import the methods of statistical physics into economics
without suﬃcient awareness of what has already been done within economics and
of the ability of economists to modify this approach in ways which make it more
acceptable. Economics is not an empty box.
There are three major areas in which econophysicists, in collaboration with econo-
mists, have a great opportunity to make an impact. All three involved network science
and the interrogation of Big Data, not from a purely data driven perspective, but ﬁl-
tered through the lens of an appropriate theory:
– Developing a model of agent behaviour which explains agent behaviour in cyber
society better than the economic model of rational choice;
– Obtaining a better understanding of the ﬂuctuations in output over the business
cycle than mainstream economics;
– Developing measures of output in cyber society.
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